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The ‘medical futility’1 debate must be understood within the 
context of modernity, which is characterised by an apparently 
unbridled striving for control, spurred on by ambition and 
self-importance, with human reason considered the measure 
of all value. Medicine has become the epitome of this impetus, 
a technologically driven science. The phenomenon of death 
is increasingly thought of as an anomaly, an embarrassment 
– even a scandal.2  
Modern people struggle to accept the inevitability of death, 
and try to muster control over death by medicalising it in order 
to control it better and to avoid its causes.3 Causes of death are 
increasingly seen to be preventable. The self-confidence of our 
technological era could be understood as a defence mechanism 
against the experience of life’s vulnerability, and a mechanism 
for coping with disability and death. The medical paradigm, 
with its justification of an all-out war against disease and death 
in order to achieve utopia for all, has rendered the medical 
paradigm unsustainable. Medical technology cannot cure or 
prevent suffering under all circumstances. It may sometimes 
prolong meaningful life. It is also able to postpone death, 
sometimes indefinitely, and sustain the organism without 
improving the underlying condition of disease, creating 
an illusion of immortality. A modern paradox is that the 
imperative to eradicate human suffering, which has become a 
societal priority against the backdrop of a narcissistic impulse 
to omnipotence,4 has itself become a cause of suffering.5 
We suggest a reconsideration of the original goal of 
medicine. Respect and care for the patient, and preservation 
of the patient’s life where possible and desirable, are of the 
utmost importance, but the main goal is seen not as the 
prolongation of life, but rather as the relief of suffering. The 
concept of medical futility has the potential to be of benefit 
in that it helps to delineate the limitations and boundaries 
of technological medicine and allows for the acceptance of 
death as a natural outcome of life and a potential friend. It 
enables a shift from the focus on curative and often aggressive, 
potentially harmful approaches, to an acknowledgement of 
palliative care, enabling issues of quality of life and care to take 
precedence over an undue and irrational insistence on the idea 
of the sanctity of life.
Definitions of futility
A quantitative definition of the futility of treatment, has been 
suggested,6 although this has not proved successful. It is based 
on the probability of a treatment not having the desired effect 
– if the p-value is ≤0.01 the treatment could be considered 
futile. The qualitative definition of futility highlights the chasm 
between the achievements of an expected goal of treatment and 
its benefit to the patient. In this context a futile treatment is one 
that merely preserves permanent unconsciousness or that fails 
to end total dependence on intensive medical care. 
Physicians should differentiate between a therapeutic 
effect, i.e. one limited to some part of the patient’s body 
(physiological definition of futility), and a benefit that 
improves the condition of the patient as a whole. Treatment 
with a therapeutic effect but without benefit to a patient is 
burdensome and could be labelled futile. The applied concept 
of futility is that futile means are not ethically indicated, and 
with few exceptions, should not be provided. 
Futile treatment for babies that could apply to all patients 
has been summarised.7 A treatment is futile when it: ‘1. … 
does not alter a person’s persistent vegetative state; 2. does 
not alter diseases or defects that make survival beyond 
infancy impossible; 3. leaves permanently unrestored a 
patient’s neurocardio-respiratory capacity, the capacity for a 
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Acceptance of the concept of medical futility facilitates 
a paradigm shift from curative to palliative medicine, 
accommodating a more humane approach and avoiding 
unnecessary suffering in the course of the dying process. 
This should not be looked upon as abandoning the patient 
but rather as providing the patient and family with an 
opportunity to come to terms with the dying process. It also 
does not entail withdrawal or passivity on the part of the 
health care professional. In addition to medical skills, the 
treating physician is responsible for guiding this process by 
demonstrating sensitivity and compassion, respecting the 
values of patients, their families and the medical staff. The 
need for training to equip medical staff to take responsibility 
as empathetic participants in end-of-life decision-making is 
underscored.
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relationship, or moral agency; or 4. will not help free a patient 
from permanent dependency on total intensive care support.’7 
It has been suggested that treatment should be regarded as 
futile if it does not achieve its physiological objective.8 Thus 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) would be regarded as 
futile if it failed to achieve a heartbeat and circulation, but 
would not be considered futile, even if the patient subsequently 
died, if it achieved restoration of circulation or if the patient 
survived without a chance of enjoying a meaningful quality 
of life. The authors believe that their physiological definition 
is superior to the qualitative and quantitative definition in 
that it avoids a value judgement. This reductionist approach 
contains a suspicious value judgement, namely that ‘when we 
administer therapy, we care only what happens to the organs, 
and we do not care what happens to the patient’.9 
Futility needs to be seen in the context of a belief in the good 
of life. Such belief will affect the choice of a futility threshold.10 
Anti-futility arguments
Ambiguity and relativity of futility
Futility judgements can sometimes be justified, but the 
concept of futility is ‘fraught with confusion, inconsistency, 
and controversy’.11 The concept is thought to make sense in 
some instances, when the treatment has no pathophysiological 
rationale, e.g. when the patient is not responding, the treatment 
has already previously been given without success, and further 
treatment will probably not achieve the goals. These legitimate 
claims of futility judgements are differentiated from other more 
general uses of the concept of futility, where the likelihood 
of success is very small but not zero, i.e. where the goals 
physicians perceive to be worth while cannot be achieved. 
In these cases, the patient’s quality of life is considered to be 
unacceptable, or the prospective benefit is deemed not to be 
worth the resources required.  
Determining when treatment becomes futile remains 
problematic and attempts at quantification of treatment 
outcome are difficult. Perceptions of futility can range from 
zero probability of success to simply poor probability. Poor 
probability needs to be defined, but determining the cut-off 
point and appointing the judge of this final verdict are both 
difficult challenges. Confusing the different levels of futility 
judgement triggers endless, insoluble disagreements between 
opposing parties.
Value judgements
Futility judgements can slide into ‘generalisation of expertise’, 
with physicians illegitimately claiming authority over 
value judgements that patients should be allowed to make 
themselves.12 Merely employing the specific terminology 
of futility could cause a physician to decide that a specific 
treatment is not ‘medically indicated’, and in this way the 
value judgement could be masked. ‘Futility determinations will 
inevitably involve value judgments: a) whether low probability 
chances are worth taking; and b) whether certain lives are of a 
quality worth living.’13
Uncertainty in prognostication
Information on the natural history of disease is often lacking 
and contributes to the complexity of the futility debate. 
Medical prognostication involves probabilities and should not 
be simply informal recall of one’s previous clinical experience. 
Rather it should reflect a best estimate derived from review 
of all valid applicable prognostic studies.  Existing predictive 
models do not seem to have improved the accuracy of 
physicians’ clinical estimates of survival. Therefore professional 
frustration with a patient’s clinical response to treatment and 
difficulty in accepting the patient’s outcome and quality of life 
could be confused with scientific assessment of the probability 
of improvement, and lead to labelling of such treatment as 
futile. Futility judgements could therefore become mistaken 
rationalisations and projections of feelings of professional 
inadequacy, failure and guilt.
Futility as the physician’s trump card
Anti-futility arguments are often championed by ethicists who 
fear that physicians may use futility arguments unilaterally, 
returning to a time when paternalism granted physicians 
unlimited decision-making power, thereby severely restricting 
patient autonomy. 
Arguments for futility which seem to establish that these 
fears are warranted have been presented.14 It has been 
suggested that patients diagnosed with permanent loss 
of consciousness should be refused medical treatment to 
prevent demoralised caregivers from being forced to provide 
care which they believe to be wasteful and futile. A further 
suggestion has been to change the definition of death to 
include a diagnosis of permanent unconsciousness. Thus, 
treatment should be withdrawn after a limited mandatory 
period of medical treatment for unconscious people, regardless 
of family objections. The American Thoracic Society15 seems 
to have embraced such a conclusion, declaring that treatment 
should be considered futile ‘if reasoning and experience 
indicate that the intervention would be highly unlikely to 
result in a meaningful survival for the patient’, and asserts that 
a ‘health care institution has the right to limit a life-sustaining 
intervention without consent’.
Conversation versus paternalism 
A model of conversation between patient and doctor has 
been developed, with the patient encouraged to take a more 
active, informed position in the therapeutic decision-making 
process.16 However, there could be a danger using the futility 
concept – some supporters might conclude that they can solve 
difficult questions without discussing them with the patient 
or family, relying solely on their professional expertise. The 
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physician-patient relationship has frequently been described as 
a conflicting power dichotomy, which seems unnecessary and 
undesirable.
Others have suggested that the dichotomy be abandoned in 
favour of a model of deliberation, where patient and physician 
interact, share and make the decision together, both parties 
accepting moral responsibility in arriving at a decision.17 
According to this deliberative model, no doctor should 
unilaterally invoke a futility judgement as trump card against 
a patient’s autonomy. Instead, a patient’s request for ongoing 
life-sustaining treatment could serve as a starting point for 
further exploration and deliberation. A futility judgement can 
never be a full justification to implement a specific action, since 
it requires further explanation in terms of values, perspectives 
and treatment goals. Futility judgements should therefore 
never end a discussion, but rather serve as a starting point. 
Pejorative connotations
Medical futility could pejoratively be misappropriated when 
it is referred to as the ‘futile care concept’. This is a serious 
misunderstanding. To care for a patient, particularly a dying 
patient, can never be futile. Whenever an act of caring takes 
place, it is not futile. Treatment options or goals can become 
futile, but up to the very end, the patient remains the focus of 
care.
Discussion 
Medical technological advances may obscure the need for 
human compassion for the dying and their loved ones. The 
death of a patient is often considered a medical failure and 
quality of end-of life care is often unsatisfactory for both 
patients and families. 
Compassionate withdrawal of treatment requires moving 
from a tactical approach and its associated goal, with the 
physician focusing on individual interventions, to a strategic 
approach, with formulation of a different treatment goal. 
This should be the result of discussions with the patient, 
parents and staff involved. Medical personnel remain 
active participants and do not have the luxury of naïvely 
withdrawing from such responsibility. The Western medical 
paradigm needs to be replaced by a more pluralistic, 
contextually sensitive paradigm for delivering health care. 
It can no longer be presupposed that physicians, nurses and 
patients share a common view of the good of life, or that 
medical practice will be conducted and framed by Judaeo-
Christian principles.18
The dominance of patient autonomy4 has been increasingly 
challenged and the concept of medical futility is central to such 
a challenge. There is a growing body of evidence suggesting 
that ‘consistent with the goals of medicine since the time of 
Hippocrates [that] physicians not only have no obligation to 
treat – or even present such options to patients and families – 
when medical interventions cannot produce a sufficient quality 
of life [such as restoring consciousness and the ability to live 
without continuous life support], but also that physicians cease 
behaving professionally if they persist even when no medically 
valid goal remains’.19
We suggest that a paradigm shift is necessary within the 
growing awareness of the limits of medical science’s propensity 
to cure, heal and extend life. Changing from cure-at-all-cost to 
care-where-cure-is-impossible indicates that there is a need for 
research and education in quality of end-of-life care. Uncritical 
acceptance of the advanced possibilities that technology 
affords medicine may lead to support of the fallacy that cure is 
effected by prolonging life. On the contrary, the dying process 
may be prolonged, which may not only prolong suffering but 
also cause it. Furthermore, empathic caring is sacrificed for 
treatment based on technological imperatives. Leadership is 
required to support the ongoing progress of clinical medicine 
as well as the evolution of our consciousness, which should 
lead to increased compassion. 
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